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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                        
_____________ 
 
No. 16-4367 
_____________ 
 
ONESIMUS GAYEMEN, 
                                   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
THE SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF ALLENTOWN; 
SHAWNDELL CANNON; GREGORY GOODIN;  
JACOB FERNANDEZ; JAHMEEN QUICK  
_____________ 
        
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
District Court No. 5-14-cv-01518 
Magistrate Judge: Henry S. Perkin 
                               
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 25, 2017 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: October 12, 2017)                              
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION*
_____________________        
                       
SMITH, Chief Judge.  
 
                                           
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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Plaintiff Onesimus Gayemen alleges that the School District of the City of 
Allentown violated his constitutional right to due process when it failed to protect 
him from gang-related violence at school.  The District Court granted summary 
judgment in favor of defendant on the ground that Gayemen failed to substantiate 
each element of the state-created-danger doctrine. We will affirm. 
I 
In March 2011, Onesimus Gayemen became a student at William Allen High 
School. On March 30, he was attacked by Shawndell Cannon, Gregory Goodin, 
Jacob Fernandez, and Jahmeen Quick, who were also students at the school. 
According to Gayemen, the attack was one of many gang-related incidents at Allen, 
which the school administration knew about but failed to adequately address. 
Gayemen relies primarily on a statement by Assistant Principal James Dotterer, who 
investigated student offenders and submitted a list of the “ten worst student 
offenders” to the administration (those students are not identified, and it is not clear 
from the record that any of Gayemen’s attackers were on the list). Dotterer was told 
that the students identified would be transferred into alternative education programs, 
but they never were.  
Gayemen sued the School District and his individual attackers.  Following a 
non-jury trial, the District Court entered judgment against Cannon, Goodin, and 
Quick for $75,000 in compensatory damages and $15,000 in punitive damages. The 
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District Court also assessed $800 in restitution against Fernandez, which the District 
Court found that Fernandez fully satisfied. The only issue on appeal is whether the 
District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the School District 
on Gayemen’s claim of state-created danger. 
II1 
We conclude that summary judgment was appropriate because Gayemen has 
failed to demonstrate any affirmative exercise of state authority that increased his 
exposure to danger. 
Gayemen asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the School District 
violated his constitutional right to due process. But as the Supreme Court has 
explained, “nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the 
State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by 
private actors.” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 
(1989) . Rather, its purpose is “to protect the people from the State, not to ensure that 
the State protect[s] [the people] from each other.” Id. at 196 (emphasis added).  “As 
a general matter, . . . a State’s failure to protect an individual against private violence 
simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 197. 
We and other circuits have developed a “state-created danger” exception to 
                                           
 1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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that general rule. A claim of state-created danger has four elements: 
(1) the harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly direct; 
 
(2) a state actor acted with a degree of culpability that shocks the 
conscience; 
 
(3) a relationship between the state and the plaintiff existed such that 
the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of the defendant’s acts, or a 
member of a discrete class of persons subjected to the potential harm 
brought about by the state’s actions, as opposed to a member of the 
public in general; and 
 
(4) a state actor affirmatively used his or her authority in a way that 
created a danger to the citizen or that rendered the citizen more 
vulnerable to danger than had the state not acted at all. 
 
Bright v. Westmoreland Cty., 443 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 “We begin with the fourth element,” the affirmative-act requirement, “as it is 
typically the most contested.” L.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 836 F.3d 235, 242 (3d Cir. 
2016). That requirement ensures that defendants are only liable for “misuse of state 
authority, rather than a failure to use it.” Id. (quoting Bright, 443 F.3d at 282). 
Because there is “inherent difficulty in drawing a line between an affirmative act and 
a failure to act,” we have found it “useful” to evaluate “whether the state actor’s 
exercise of authority resulted in a departure from [the] status quo.” Id. at 242–43. 
 As the District Court correctly held, Gayemen fails that element. Gayemen 
primarily relies on statements by Assistant Principal Dotterer, who “tells of having 
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continuing problems with gang related violence” and “exposes that the entire issue 
was ignored and none of these students were removed from the school.” Appellant 
Br. 19. As Gayemen himself puts it, he alleges “the failure of the School District to 
take appropriate steps to address the student affiliated gang violence.” Id. at 20. But 
that is just what the Due Process Clause does not protect. The allegation does not 
entail any “departure from [the] status quo,” L.R., 836 F.3d at 243, and thus asserts 
a mere “failure to use” state authority, id. at 242 (quoting Bright, 443 F.3d at 282); 
see Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 178 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc), as amended (June 
14, 2013) (holding that the failure to expel a bully was not an affirmative act); D.R. 
ex rel. L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1374 (3d Cir. 
1992) (en banc) (no liability for school’s failure to investigate and stop instances of 
sexual abuse). Gayemen has not identified any action that “rendered [him] more 
vulnerable to danger than had the state not acted at all.” Morrow, 719 F.3d at 178 
(quoting Bright, 443 F.3d at 281); cf. L.R., 836 F.3d at 244 (finding an affirmative 
act where a teacher released a kindergarten student into the custody of an 
unidentified adult). 
 Gayemen attempts to recharacterize the School District’s inaction as an 
affirmative effort to “ignore[], bur[y], and conceal[] Dotterer’s reports of prior 
violent acts.”  Appellant Br. 20. But other than the fact that the School District took 
no action with regard to Dotterer’s investigation, Gayemen cites no evidence of 
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affirmative concealment.2 The School District’s failure to remove students from the 
school simply does not constitute an affirmative act, even if school policy required 
their removal. See Morrow, 719 F.3d at 178 (“[W]e decline to hold that a school’s 
alleged failure to enforce a disciplinary policy is equivalent to an affirmative act 
under the circumstances here.”). This Court has repeatedly rejected similar efforts to 
recharacterize inaction as action. See, e.g., id. at 179 (“[M]erely restating the 
Defendants’ inaction as an affirmative failure to act does not alter the passive nature 
of the alleged conduct.”); Stanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 312 (3d Cir. 2006) (per 
curiam); see also Morrow, 719 F.3d at 178 (noting that, if failing to expel a student 
counted as an affirmative act, “the state-created danger exception would swallow the 
rule” and “[s]chools would always be liable . . . for any injury that could be linked 
to either action or inaction”). 
 Finally, Gayemen argues that the School District’s inaction regarding violence 
                                           
 2 The only claim of affirmative concealment identified by the District Court 
involved a security officer, Michael Witt, who was allegedly instructed not to report 
violent incidents. Gayemen v. Sch. Dist. of the City of Allentown, No. 14-CV-1518, 
2016 WL 3014896, at *11 n.8 (E.D. Pa. May 26, 2016). But after a careful review 
of the record, the District Court concluded that “[t]here is no evidence that reports 
of assaults were concealed or the facts were diluted.” Id. The District Court further 
noted that “it is admitted by Gayemen that Witt had no prior knowledge of any of 
the students involved in this assault.” Id. Gayemen did not make the argument 
regarding Witt “with specificity” in the District Court, id., and he does not make it 
at all in this Court. But even if he had, we see no error in the District Court’s analysis 
or review of the record. 
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“may have” emboldened the perpetrators, making them “confident in their ability to 
conduct their attacks in the open, and in front of any passersby.”  Appellant Br. 21. 
But as we have held, that allegation does not convert the School District’s inaction 
into an affirmative act. See Bright, 443 F.3d at 284 (rejecting the argument that an 
“inexplicable delay emboldened” a perpetrator because “what is alleged to have 
created a danger was the failure of the defendants to utilize their state authority, not 
their utilization of it”). 
III 
Having concluded that Gayemen’s claim fails the fourth element of the state-
created-danger doctrine, we need not address the remaining elements.3  See id. at 
283.  We will therefore affirm. 
                                           
3 We agree with the District Court that Gayemen’s Monell claim fails because there 
was no underlying constitutional violation.   
